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Abstract
Although numerous IFQ programs include active participation measures intended to
retain or transition fishing privileges to active fishermen, there has been limited
research on the efficacy of these measures. This study addresses this gap by
examining the impacts of active participation measures in the Alaska halibut and
sablefish IFQ program, which were intended to provide for an ultimate transition of
the catcher vessel fleets in these fisheries to becoming fully individual-owned and
owner-operated. This paper shows that the effectiveness of these measures has been
mixed and constrained by apparently strong incentives for many initial recipients of
quota shares to effectively lease their annual IFQ allocations (through the use of
hired skippers) rather than to sell their quota shares. Perhaps most problematic is the
emergence of a class of wholly absentee quota shareholders, who hold only nominal
interest in the vessel upon which their IFQ is fished, do not share in the risk of
fishing, and continue to profit from the fishery while residing far away from the
actual fishing grounds. There is also anecdotal evidence of differing cultural contexts
for hired skipper use and second-generation entry between the Seattle and
Alaska-based fleets in the Alaska halibut and sablefish fisheries. Wherein acting as
a hired skipper may be analogous to an apprenticeship that facilitates quota
share acquisition in the Seattle fleet, Alaskan hired skippers may be more
analogous to strict lessees, who ultimately compete for quota shares in a market
that includes initial recipients and second-generation shareholders both of whom
were gifted quota shares.
Keywords: Active participation measures; Owner-on-board; Hired skipper;
Second-generation shareholders; Adaptive management
Introduction
Since the 1970s, managers have employed economic solutions to address overcapacity
and overfishing in fisheries by allocating exclusive harvesting privileges to a defined
group of participants through individual fishing, or transferable, quota (IFQ or ITQ)
programs. In these types of management programs initial recipients receive quota
shares, a percentage of an overall total allowable catch (TAC) in the fishery, which are
translated into annual IFQ allocations (fishable pounds). Although numerous
researchers have documented the success of these management regimes at increasing
economic efficiency, profitability, and product quality, improving safety, managing the
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harvest within the TAC, and overall working conditions in the fisheries (Arnason
2005, Brinson and Thunberg 2013, Campbell et al. 2000, Costello et al. 2008, Dupont
2000, Grafton 1995, Grimm et al. 2012, Hilborn et al. 2005, Hughes and Woodley
2007, Newell et al. 2005a), others have shown that these types of management
programs can have adverse impacts on some stakeholders and coastal communities
due to consolidation and associated employment losses, changes in processing needs,
and shifts in regional distribution of fishing privileges (Carothers 2008, 2013,
Carothers et al. 2010, Copes and Charles 2004, McCay 2004, Olson 2011).
Researchers have also shown that leasing in IFQ programs, wherein the quota share-
holder leases the annual IFQ allocation derived from his quota shares, can allow inactive
fishermen to retain their shares and profit from the harvest of their IFQ without incurring
the physical or financial risks of fishing, which can contribute to quota share prices
becoming prohibitively expensive for the next generation of fishermen (Squires et al.
1998). Leasing can also contribute to the emergence of a class of absentee shareholders in
the fishery, due to the entrance of investment speculators and to fishermen relying on
leasing arrangements rather than selling their shares when they are no longer willing or
able to fish their IFQ themselves (Le Gallic and Mongruel 2006, Pinkerton and Edwards
2009, van Putten and Gardner 2010, Stewart and Callagher 2011). Absentee shareholders
may also have fewer ties to coastal communities than active fishermen, resulting in a
transfer of the benefits from fishing privileges out of these communities (Carothers 2008,
2013, Copes and Charles 2004, McCay 2004, Olson 2011). Several researchers have shown
that the implementation of a catch share or limited access program was associated with
the migration of fishing privileges away from rural communities towards urban centers
(Carothers et al. 2010, Knapp 2011). Since urban ownership of quota shares is sometimes
associated with increased leasing (Le Gallic and Mongruel 2006), distributional and
equity issues may be exacerbated in the fishery with geographic lines dividing lessors
from lessees. Another social impact of absentee quota ownership could occur when
profits from the fishery are earned through high lease rates charged by individuals
that do not share in the annual risk of fishing. This scenario could be preventing
those profits from being reinvested in the halibut and sablefish fisheries themselves,
potentially contributing to the continued use of older vessels and gear and resulting
decreases in harvesting efficiency and overall safety.
Managers, who are concerned with such impacts, have developed various active
participation measures to ensure that quota is retained by active fishermen, including
restricting leasing, constraining transferability to participants with fishing experience,
and implementing owner-on-board requirements for the harvest of IFQ (GAO 2004).
Despite the preponderance of these measures in IFQ programs, there has been limited
research examining the efficacy of active participation measures at achieving their
intended objectives. This paper addresses this literature gap by examining active
participation measures in the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ program.
Background on the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ program
When the NPFMC implemented an IFQ program to manage the fixed gear (pot
and hook-and-line) halibut and sablefish fisheries off Alaska in 1995 it included
several active participation measures. The IFQ program was implemented to
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reduce overcapacity and eliminate the race to fish, which had been occurring in
these fisheries at that time. Quota shares in the program were allocated as per-
centages of the TAC to persons based on historical participation in the fisheries.
These shares are translated into annual IFQ allocations, or fishable pounds, based
upon the annual TAC. Quota shares are both area and vessel class specific, with
no trading allowed between these categorizations. In both fisheries, there is a class of
quota shares allocated to catcher processors, and multiple classes of catcher vessel
shares, which are designated on the basis of vessel length (three in the halibut fishery
and two in the sablefish fishery). Figures 1 and 2 show the regulatory areas for the
halibut and sablefish fisheries.
In developing the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ program the NPFMC was con-
cerned with the potential for investment speculators to buy catcher vessel quota shares
and for the emergence of a class of absentee catcher vessel shareholders (NMFS
1992a). In addition to the tie between owner-operators and coastal communities, the
concern focused more on catcher vessels that deliver to shoreside processing plants
and tend to be more tied to coastal communities than on catcher processors that
process on board and were already largely corporate owned when the IFQ program
was being developed (NMFS 1992a). Therefore, the NPFMC included several active
participation measures for catcher vessel quota shares in the IFQ program design, with
the intent to maintain existent owner-operators and provide for an ultimate transition
to wholly individual-owned and owner-operated fleets in both the halibut and sablefish
fisheries. These measures include a prohibition on leasing after the first three years of
the program, a limitation on the acquisition of quota shares by corporate entities (e.g.
corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies), and a limitation on the
use of hired skippers (i.e., someone designated by a quota shareholder to fish the quota
shareholder’s annual IFQ allocation) to initial quota share recipients of the program
(NMFS 1992a). Greater restrictions on quota share acquisitions by corporate
Fig. 1 International Pacific Halibut Commission Regulatory Areas. Note: Reprinted from the National Marine
Fisheries, Alaska Regional Office webpage. Areas 2A and 2B are not part of the IFQ program. Available: http://
http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/maps/sport/areas.htm
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entities and the use of hired skippers were implemented in area 2C and the South-
east Outside area of the halibut and sablefish fisheries, respectively, to maintain
what had historically been small vessel, owner-operated fleets and to facilitate entry
for second-generation quota shareholders in these areas. Although they do not
overlap perfectly, these two areas encompass what is commonly referred to as
Southeast Alaska and will be referred to hereinafter as the Southeast regulatory
areas.
Using data published by the NMFS and the NPFMC, this paper examines the impacts
of the active participation measures in the halibut and sablefish IFQ program. First, the
paper presents an analysis of the impacts of the measures that apply to all catcher vessel
quota shareholders by assessing changes in quota share ownership of corporate entities
and changes in the use of hired skippers since program implementation. Second, the
paper presents an assessment of the impacts of the greater restrictions in the Southeast
regulatory areas by examining the differences in the percent of area quota shares held by
corporate entities and the use of hired skippers between the Southeast areas and the other
regulatory areas.
Active participation measures in the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ
program
Restriction on acquisition of QS to individuals
In the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ program, the acquisition of catcher vessel
quota shares by corporate entities is restricted to those that are initial recipients of
quota shares in the program. All second-generation owners of catcher vessel quota
shares must be “IFQ crewmembers” - individuals who have at least 150 days of ex-
perience as part of a harvesting crew in any U.S. fishery (NMFS 1998). That is, no
Fig. 2 Sablefish IFQ Program Regulatory Areas. Note: Reprinted from the National Marine Fisheries, Alaska
Regional Office webpage. Available: http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/rr/figures/fig14.pdf
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new corporate entities can enter into the fishery by purchasing catcher vessel
quota shares. Corporate entities that were initial recipients of catcher vessel shares
could purchase additional catcher vessel shares, until December 1, 2014, after
which transfer of catcher vessel shares is limited to individual initial recipients of
catcher vessel shares and IFQ crewmembers (NMFS 2014a). The initial limitation
on the acquisition of catcher vessel quota shares was intended to ensure that even-
tually, through attrition, all corporate entities would be eliminated from the fishery
(NMFS 1992b).
In the Southeast regulatory areas only individuals (IFQ crewmembers and initial
recipients of catcher vessel shares) are allowed to acquire catcher vessel quota
shares. Corporate entities, even if they are initial recipients in the IFQ program,
are prohibited from purchasing catcher vessel quota shares in the Southeast regula-
tory areas (NMFS 1998). This prohibition was implemented to maintain the com-
petitive position of what had historically been an owner-operated fleet in these
areas as there was concern that corporate entities could outbid owner-operators
for quota shares (NMFS 1992b).
A regulation that went into effect on December 1, 2014 effectively constrains
catcher vessel quota share transfers in all IFQ regulatory areas to IFQ crewmem-
bers and initial recipients. However, this analysis is limited to the pre-2014 years.
Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, we will maintain the differentiation in
the persons eligible to harvest catcher vessel quota shares between the Southeast
and the other regulatory areas.
Restrictions on leasing
The NPFMC also sought to incentivize the transition to owner-operated fleets by
prohibiting leasing of all IFQ derived from catcher vessel quota shares after the
first three years of the program. For these first three years, catcher vessel quota
shareholders were allowed to lease up to 10 % of their quota shares, subject to
the same restrictions as permanent quota share transfers (i.e., no inter-vessel class
or inter-area trading and transfers only to eligible persons – i.e. initial recipients
or IFQ crewmembers). This temporary leasing allowance was included to give
fishermen more flexibility to plan their fishing operations, and to allow partici-
pants to better adapt to the new program, as it was expected to initially be easier
for shareholders to evaluate the value of their annual IFQ allocation rather than
their quota share allocation (NMFS 1992b).
Hired skipper/owner-on-board mandate
Catcher vessel quota shareholders may employ hired skippers to harvest their annual
IFQ allocation, as long as the shareholder is able to demonstrate at least a 20 % owner-
ship interest in the vessel on which their annual IFQ allocation is being fished. Any
catcher vessel quota shareholders who are not initial recipients (hereinafter referred to
as second generation shareholders) are required to be on board when their annual IFQ
allocation is being harvested (NMFS 1998). The NPFMC implemented these differenti-
ated mandates for initial recipients and second generation shareholders in order to give
the former the latitude to continue the business practices that they had prior to the
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implementation of the IFQ program while still providing for an ultimate transition to
an owner-operated fleet (NMFS 2014a).
Catcher vessel quota shareholders in the Southeast regulatory areas are subject
to greater restrictions than in the other regulatory areas. In the Southeast, only
corporate initial recipients may hire skippers. That is, all individuals (including ini-
tial recipients) must be on board when their annual catcher vessel IFQ allocation
is being fished (NMFS 1998). Additional restrictions were placed in the Southeast
regulatory areas in order to maintain what had historically been a small vessel,
owner-operated fleet and to facilitate entry into the fisheries in these areas, by en-
suring that aging quota shareholders have to sell their quota shares once they are
no longer willing or able to fish their annual IFQ allocation themselves (NPFMC
2014).
Amendments to the hired skipper provision
Since the start of the program, the hired skipper provision has been amended sev-
eral times to reflect the NPFMC’s ongoing concern that the use of hired skippers
by participants does not reflect the intended goals of the program. In 1999, the
NPFMC amended the provision to include the current mandate for 20 % vessel
ownership for quota shareholders using hired skippers, because some participants
were purchasing nominal interests in vessels to meet the original vessel ownership
requirements (NPFMC 2014). The mandate for a defined percentage of vessel own-
ership interest was intended to ensure that quota shareholders were using hired
skippers on vessels actually owned by the quota shareholder, rather than leasing
their IFQ to the owner of another vessel. In 2002, the NPFMC amended the IFQ
program to include a provision that a quota shareholder may use a hired skipper
on a vessel owned by a corporation in which that quota shareholder has at least a
20 % interest (NPFMC 2014). In 2007, the NPFMC passed an amendment specify-
ing the required documents for proof of the requisite vessel ownership: 1) an
Abstract of Title for a documented vessel showing the required 20 % vessel owner-
ship interest, or 2) a State of Alaska vessel registration or license for undocu-
mented vessels (NMFS 2007). Prior to this amendment, the requirement was
simply for written documentation of ownership, which was often difficult to verify,
and there was concern that quota shareholders were continuing to engage in infor-
mal vessel ownership arrangements in order to be able to use hired skippers
(NPFMC 2014).
The NPFMC recently elected to take two more substantive measures to restrict the use
of hired skippers. First, in order to address that some shareholders are still using hired
skippers on vessels that they own only for the duration of the fishing trip, the NPFMC
added a mandate that an individual quota shareholder must own a minimum 20 % inter-
est in the vessel upon which the skipper will harvest their IFQ allocation for the 12-month
period prior to using a hired skipper (NMFS 2014b). Second, the NPFMC recommended
regulations that prohibit the use of a hired skipper to fish IFQ halibut or sablefish derived
from catcher vessel quota shares that were purchased after February 12, 2010. This rule,
known as the Sunset Provision, went into effect on December 1, 2014 (NMFS 2014a). This
second rule is intended to limit the amount of quota shares available for harvest by hired
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skippers. Furthermore, it should ensure that the initial recipients who utilize hired skippers
would no longer be competing on the market for quota shares.
Analysis of the impacts of the active participation measures
Impacts outside of Southeast Alaska
Hired skipper use outside of Southeast Alaska
Despite the efforts to implement active participation measures in these fisheries, the
use of hired skippers has increased significantly above levels that existed at the start of
the IFQ program, as both the number of quota shareholders, who hire skippers, and
the percentage of the total halibut IFQ landed by hired skippers have increased (NMFS
2014a). Figure 1 shows the changes in the use of hired skippers by individual initial re-
cipients in the halibut and sablefish fisheries from 1995 to 2011. Note that this figure
does not include the Southeast regulatory areas of the two fisheries due to the differ-
ences between how the program was set up for Southeast Alaska compared to the rest
of the fishing grounds. Although, there has been a significant attrition of individual ini-
tial recipients since the IFQ program was implemented, the number of these individ-
uals who hired skippers to fish their annual IFQ allocations has increased significantly.
In fact, the percent of individual initial recipients who hired skippers has increased
from 3 % to 33 % and from 9 % to 42 % in the halibut and sablefish fisheries, respect-
ively, during this time period. Furthermore, Fig. 3 shows that from 1995 to 2011 the
percent of individual initial recipients’ landed IFQ harvested by hired skippers in-
creased from 9 % to 54 % in the halibut fishery and from 7 % to 73 % in the sablefish
fishery. This increasing use of hired skippers corresponds to the aging of initial quota
share recipients, who, instead of divesting themselves of their shareholdings are opting
to utilize hired skippers to fish their annual IFQ allocations. Furthermore, those initial
recipients who were previously utilizing hired skippers have consolidated quota shares,
which accounts for some of the increase in the amount of quota landed for individual
initial recipients.
In February of 2011, when the hired skipper Sunset Provision was being
discussed at the NPFMC, public testimony revealed that this was a very conten-
tious and divisive issue. It was evident from this testimony and other literature
that several types of hired skipper arrangements have emerged in the fishery.
Some initial recipients maintain their vessels upon retiring from fishing and
promote a crewmember into the wheelhouse, who acts as their hired skipper.
There is also a class of retired initial recipients (described in more detail below),
who are absentee shareholders and engage in relationships with hired skippers
that are functionally equivalent to leasing (NPFMC 2014). The switch to using
hired skippers is gradual for many initial recipients. For example, initial recipients
with large holdings may use hired skippers during the long fishing season in
order to take a break from fishing. There are also some concerning trends in
how participants are meeting the owner-on-board requirement for second-
generation quota shareholders. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some second-
generation quota shareholders go on board as crewmembers for the duration of the
trip during which their IFQ is being harvested, but do not actually participate in the fish-
ing activity (NPFMC 2009, 2014). The skipper and his crew harvest the shareholder’s
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quota while he is below deck and then the vessel and the shareholder split the ex-
vessel revenue from the harvest. This type of second-generation shareholder (known
as a walk-on or ride-along) (Van der Voo 2013) appears to view ownership of quota
shares as a financial investment rather than a lifestyle. This would indicate that
even when the quota shares do transition to second-generation owners, the current
regulations are not fully effective at providing for a transition to an owner-operator
fleet.
Although the Sunset Provision is meant to expedite the transition to an owner-
operator fleet, which should facilitate entry for second-generation shareholders while
constraining how initial recipients can use their quota shares, public testimony at the
2011 NPFMC meeting on the potential impacts of this provision was not divided along
generational lines. The potential beneficiaries of this provision, second-generation
shareholders and hired skippers who may want to buy quota shares, testified on both
sides of the issue. Within this group, some argued that the emergence of a generation
of absentee shareholders was never the intention of the NPFMC, while others testified
that the hired skipper arrangements allowed them to make a living while incrementally
purchasing quota shares. Initial recipients also testified on both sides, with similar
arguments.
The divide between industry participants centered more on historic differences
between the fleet based in Seattle and the fleet based in Alaska rather than generational
divisions, revealing some continued cultural distinctions in how these two geographic
groups participate in the fishery and think about second-generation ownership. (It
should be noted that there are participants in the halibut and sablefish IFQ fisheries
from numerous other states, but those testifying to the NPFMC at the 2011 meeting
were from Alaska and Seattle and these two fleets comprise the vast majority of partici-
pants in these two fisheries). The Seattle-based fleet has historically consisted of large,
Fig. 3 Use of Hired Skippers in the Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Fisheries by Individual Initial Recipients
(1995 to 2011). Source: (NMFS 2012)
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highliner vessels while the Alaska fleet is much more diverse and includes numerous
small (under 60 foot) vessels (Committee on the Merchant Marine and 1921, Bernton
2010, Harms 2014). Of those testifying to the NPFMC at the 2011 meeting, the Alaska
contingent was largely in favor of the Sunset Provision and an expedited transfer of
fishing privileges in the IFQ fisheries to the next generation of shareholders, asserting
that initial recipients had been given ample time to make their mark in the fishery. On
the other hand, many in the Seattle contingent testified that the shareholder-hired skip-
per relationship is a key component of their family-run fishing businesses, as sons
acquire valuable experience and capital to invest in their own quota shares while they
work as hired skippers for their fathers. Periods of transition between two generations
are not uncommon in fisheries and acting as a hired skipper may be analogous to an
apprenticeship or a rite-of-passage (Package-Ward and Himes-Cornell 2014, Pinto da
Silva and Kitts 2006).
Another significant difference between the Seattle and the Alaska based fleets
that was evident from the 2011 testimony before the NPFMC was access to lend-
ing institutions and financial assistance with purchasing quota shares for hired
skippers and second-generation shareholders. Amongst the Seattle-based fleet, some
initial recipients will use the collateral that they have in their own shareholdings to
assist hired skippers in buying quota shares. It was contended that whereas crew-
members and hired skippers in Seattle may be receiving financial assistance from
the initial recipients with whom they are affiliated, their counterparts in Alaska
often live in small coastal communities with limited access to financial resources.
In addition, there is evidence of a growing number of “gifted” (i.e. non-
compensated) quota share transactions to second-generation shareholders in the
IFQ fisheries (NPFMC 2014), which can perpetuate distributional and access
dichotomies.
Perhaps the most contrary to the original intent of the NPFMC for a fully owner-
operated catcher vessel fleet is the use of hired skippers by a group of wholly absent share-
holders. These shareholders sometimes reside far away from the location of the actual
fisheries, have minimal if any risk in the fisheries because they hold only nominal interests
in the vessels upon which their IFQ is harvested, but continue to collect a check from their
hired skippers (NPFMC Public Testimony 2011). A business model of strict reliance on
hired skippers and disinvestment in vessel ownership is precisely the kind of absentee
ownership that the NPFMC sought to prevent in the IFQ fisheries (NMFS 1992a). It was
argued by some of those testifying at the 2011 meeting that limiting the capacity for share-
holders to use hired skippers in this way (by increasing the vessel ownership requirement to
50 % and mandating the use of Internal Revenue Service documents to prove this owner-
ship) would effectively address the misuse of the hired skipper use privilege but not curtail
the capacity for family operations to continue with their established business practices
(NPFMC Public Testimony). Although hired skipper fees are not tracked in the fishery,
anecdotal evidence indicates that in some areas shareholders retain up to 75 % of ex-
vessel revenue for the landing of their annual IFQ allocation (NPFMC Public Testimony,
der Voo and Lee 2013). At these rates, shareholders may be earning more from retaining
their shares and utilizing hired skippers than from selling their shares and investing that
money elsewhere. Similar trends in absenteeism and increasing lease rates have been stud-
ied in Canada (Pinkerton and Edwards, 2009), Tasmania (van Putten and Gardner 2010),
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Iceland (Guyader and Thebaud 2001), New Zealand (Newell et al. 2005b) and elsewhere
(Le Gallic and Mongruel 2006).
Participation of corporate entities outside of Southeast Alaska
Whereas the transition to owner-operated fleets has been slow, the transition to
individual-owned fleets has been more successful, with quota shares migrating from
corporate entities to individuals. Figures 4 and 5 show the distribution of quota shares
between individuals and corporate entities in the halibut and sablefish fisheries,
respectively, from 1995 to 2011. In the halibut fishery, 8 % of the total quota shares
have transferred from corporate entities to individuals, while 10 % of the shares in the
sablefish fishery have transferred from corporate entities to individuals. However, cor-
porate entities have historically and continue to have a much greater presence in the
sablefish fishery than in the halibut fishery, likely due to much greater capital invest-
ment requirements to participate in the sablefish fishery, which is prosecuted in off-
shore and deeper waters than halibut. It should be noted that herein corporate
entities include corporations formed and solely owned by individual initial recipients,
which may be slowing the transition to fully individual-owned catcher vessel fleets in
these fisheries.
Impacts of the more restrictive measures in the Southeast regulatory areas
Impacts of the prohibition on acquisition of quota shares by corporate entities
Given the prohibition on the acquisition of quota shares by any corporate entity in the
Southeast regulatory areas, it is reasonable to expect that the percentage of the area
quota shares held by corporate entities would be lower, and the divestiture of quota
shareholdings by corporate entities would be higher, in these areas than in the other
regulatory areas. To assess this hypothesis, we compared quota shareholdings and rates
of quota share divestiture of corporate entities in the different regulatory areas.
Figures 6 and 7 show the percent of area quota shares held by individuals and corpor-
ate entities in the halibut and sablefish fisheries in 1995 and 2011. “Individuals” in these
Fig. 4 Percent of Total Halibut Quota Shares Held by Entity Type (1995 to 2011). Source: (NMFS 2014c)
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figures includes both initial recipients and second-generation quota shareholders. As
expected in comparison to the other regulatory areas, in the Southeast regulatory
areas corporate entities hold significantly smaller percentages of the total area quota
shares than individuals. Given that in the Southeast regulatory areas corporate entities
held significantly smaller percentages of the areas’ quota shares at initial allocation, it
may be more informative to analyze the changes in the shareholdings of corporate
entities in these areas from 1995 to 2011. Over this time period, in the halibut fishery,
the percent decrease in quota shareholdings of corporate entities was the largest in
area 2C (at −60 %); however, in the sablefish fishery, the largest percent decrease was
in the Bering Sea regulatory area (at −55 %), compared to a decrease of 35 % in the
Southeast Outside regulatory area.
Based on the above examination of shareholdings by different participant types, the
hypothesis about the impacts of the special restriction on corporate entities in the
Southeast regulatory areas is only partially substantiated. Figures 6 and 7 show that
individuals now own the majority of the quota shares across all areas in both fisheries,
Fig. 5 Percent of Total Sablefish Quota Shares Held by Entity Type (1995 to 2011). Source: (NMFS 2014c)
Fig. 6 Percent of Quota Shares Held by Individuals and Corporate Entities by Regulatory Area in the Halibut
Fisheries in 1995 and 2011. Source: (NMFS 2014c)
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with the exception of the Aleutian Islands regulatory area of the sablefish fishery. Further-
more, the decrease in the percent of area quota shares held by corporate entities has been
substantial across all areas, with the exception of the western Yakutat area of the sablefish
fishery. Although corporate entities own less of the total quota shares in the Southeast
regulatory areas than in other regulatory areas, the percent of the total area quota shares
held by corporate entities in the Southeast regulatory areas was also less than in the other
regulatory areas at the start of the IFQ program. Furthermore, the rate of quota share di-
vestiture of corporate entities in the Southeast regulatory areas compared to the other
regulatory areas is not significantly higher. As in the other regulatory areas, the continued
participation of corporate entities in the Southeast regulatory areas may be in part due to
the formation of corporations by individual initial recipients.
Impacts of limiting the use of hired skippers to corporate entities
Given the prohibition on the use of hired skippers by all individuals and the prohibition on
the acquisition of quota shares by corporate entities in the Southeast regulatory areas, it is
reasonable to expect that the use of hired skippers would be lower and the facility of entry
would be higher in the Southeast regulatory areas than in the other areas. To assess this
hypothesis, we first analyzed the percent of initial recipients who hired skippers and
the percent of total landings that were landed by hired skippers. Second, we analyzed
the attrition rate of initial quota share recipients and the percent of area quota shares
held by second-generation quota shareholders.
Table 1 presents the summary data of skipper use by regulatory area for both the
halibut and sablefish fisheries for 2011. The hired skipper use statistics in the table in-
clude both individual and corporate quota shareholder usage. The table shows that the
percent of initial recipients who hired skippers is significantly lower in the Southeast
regulatory areas than in the other areas for both fisheries, with 4 % in halibut area 2C
and 21 % in the sablefish Southeast Outside area, compared to an average rate in the
other areas of 40 % and of 59 %, respectively. The percent of the total harvest landed by
Fig. 7 Percent of Area Quota Shares held by Individuals and Corporate Entities in the Sablefish Fishery in
1995 and 2011. Source: (NMFS 2014c)
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hired skippers is also significantly lower in the Southeast regulatory areas than in the
other areas. In the halibut fishery in area 2C, hired skippers accounted for 3 % of the total
landings, compared to an average rate of 62 % across the other areas in 2011, whereas in
the Southeast regulatory area of the sablefish fishery, hired skippers accounted for 17 % of
the total landings, compared to an average rate of 82 % across the other areas in 2011. Al-
though the hypothesis on the impacts of the greater restriction on hired skipper use in
Southeast Alaska is substantiated by the data in Table 1, these areas have also had histor-
ically much smaller numbers of corporate entities, which have to use hired skippers, than
the other regulatory areas. Therefore, the lower use of hired skippers in the Southeast
regulatory areas may be a product of relatively few corporate entities, a greater number of
owner-operators since program implementation, and the special restriction on hired skip-
per use.
Figures 8 and 9 compare the attrition rate of initial quota share recipients (including
both individuals and corporate entities) and the percent of the total area quota shares
held by initial recipients and second-generation quota shareholders across the regula-
tory areas. Between 1995 and 2010, the total attrition rate of catcher vessel quota
share units held by initial recipients was 32 % in halibut area 2C, compared to an
average rate of 29 % across the other regulatory areas for this fishery. In the sablefish
Southeast Outside regulatory area, the total attrition rate was 29 %, compared to an
average rate of 32 % across the other regulatory areas. That is, the total attrition rates
of initial recipients are not significantly higher for the Southeast regulatory areas than
the other regulatory areas of the two fisheries. The percentage of area catcher vessel
quota shares owned by second-generation quota shareholders has increased across all
areas. The percentage of the total catcher vessel quota shares held by second-
generation quota shareholders was 37 % in halibut area 2C, compared to an average
rate of 39 % across the other regulatory areas, and 33 % in the Southeast Outside


















2C 24 29 681 4 % 3 %
3A 219 271 899 30 % 43 %
3B 156 166 303 55 % 56 %
4A 60 66 128 52 % 52 %
4B 34 38 50 76 % 75 %
4C/D 26 30 60 50 % 66 %
Sablefish
AI 32 34 53 64 % 95 %
BS 42 34 61 56 % 65 %
CG 136 148 261 57 % 84 %
SE 41 49 252 19 % 17 %
WG 54 67 99 68 % 93 %
WY 78 98 149 66 % 72 %
*Regulatory areas 4C and 4D are combined because area 4C IFQ can be fished in area
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sablefish area compared to an average rate of 35 % across the other regulatory areas
in 2010. That is, the quota shareholdings of second-generation quota shareholders are
not significantly higher in the Southeast regulatory areas than in the other areas.
Visual examination of Figs. 8 and 9 does not appear to support the hypothesis that the
more restrictive use of hired skippers in the Southeast regulatory areas has provided for
more facilitated entry into the IFQ fisheries. The exodus of initial quota share recipients
from the other regulatory areas indicates that given the ability to hire skippers to fish their
IFQ, some quota shareholders will still opt to retire from the fishery altogether rather than
to use a hired skipper. It should be noted, however, that there is anecdotal evidence that
some retiring initial recipients have sold their quota shares in the Southeast regulatory
areas but retained their shares elsewhere (or even bought more elsewhere) to be harvested
Fig. 9 Attrition rate of initial recipients and percent of total area catcher vessel quota shares held by initial
recipients and second generation quota shareholders in the sablefish fishery in 1995 and 2010. Source:
(NPFMC 2014)
Fig. 8 Attrition rate of initial recipients and percent of total area catcher vessel quota shares held by initial
recipients and second generation quota shareholders in the halibut fishery in 1995 and 2010 (NPFMC 2014)
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by hired skippers (NPFMC Public Testimony 2011). This trend may be too recent to show
up in the data as a substantial increase in second-generation quota share ownership, but
it may begin to evidence itself in the next five to ten years as these initial recipients con-
tinue to retire.
As a primary factor that could impact entry and exit decisions, different expectations
of current and future earnings across the regulatory areas are reflected in variable quota
share prices. These anticipated earnings are based upon current differences in and
expectations about future changes to factors such as ex-vessel prices, operating costs,
competition for quota, TACs, and regulatory changes across the areas (Karpoff 1989,
Wilen 1989, Huppert et al. 1996). The expectation is that the highest rates of entry and
exit would occur in areas with the lowest quota prices, as new entrants want to buy
cheap quota shares and initial recipients may be less inclined to retain quota shares
that have not appreciated much in value since the start of the program. In reviewing
Table 2, which shows mean quota share prices (expressed as nominal dollars per pound
of associated IFQ) by area for the halibut and sablefish fisheries, this hypothesis holds
true for the areas in the sablefish fishery with the highest entry and exit rates, but less
so for the halibut fishery, where despite high quota share prices in area 2C, entry and
exit rates in this area are still the third highest for the fishery.
Given that the use of quota shares in Southeast Alaska is more constrained than in
the other regulatory areas (i.e., no hired skipper use by individuals and QS transfers
only to IFQ crewmembers), we would expect quota share prices to be lower in these
areas than in the other areas. However, quota shares in the Southeast regulatory areas
may be more valuable because of the extent of demand in these areas in comparison to
other areas. For example, halibut in Southeast Alaska is found in protected inland
Table 2 Quota Prices and Ex-vessel Prices in the Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Fisheries. Source:
(NMFS 2011)
Yeara Area Mean Price $/IFQ Yeara Area Mean Price $/IFQb
Halibut Sablefish
1995 2C 7.58 1995 AI Unknown
2010 22.71 2009 Unknown
1995 3A 7.37 1995 BS 4.87
2010 21.06 2009 3.26
1995 3B 6.53 1995 CG 6.02
2010 18.63 2009 16.75
1995 4A 5.64 1995 SE 6.73
2010 12.60 2009 18.22
1995 4B 6.14 1995 WG 6.16
2010 8.93 2009 12.11
1997 4C 6.29 1995 WY 5.93
2010 9.90 2009 17.18
1997 4D 5.85
2010 9.50
aSablefish IFQ prices are most recently available for 2009, whereas halibut IFQ prices are most recently available for 2010.
Halibut IFQ prices were not available for 1995 in Areas 4C and 4D. The first year these prices were available was 1997
b QS prices are not comparable across regulatory areas necessitating the use of mean quota share prices expressed as
dollars per associated pound of IFQ
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waters and can therefore be harvested from small vessels with limited gear. This in
addition to the deep cultural roots of halibut fishing in Southeast Alaska, where rural
residents have historically and continue to fish halibut for subsistence, has likely con-
tributed to substantial competition for this area’s quota (Himes-Cornell et al. 2013).
Sablefish fishing, on the other hand, demands slightly more investment, as it is found
in deeper and less protected waters, although many fishermen in Southeast Alaska own
both halibut and sablefish quota shares. Greater demand for both sablefish and halibut
quota shares in Southeast Alaska can also be attributed to the number of people living
adjacent to this regulatory area, which has the second largest human population after
Area 3A.
Conclusions
The effectiveness of the active participation measures in the Alaska halibut and sable-
fish IFQ program has been mixed. Whereas the limit on corporate ownership of quota
shares has been relatively successful in providing for a transition of shareholdings to
individuals, the transition to owner-operators has been hampered by the continued use
of hired skippers by initial recipients. In the Southeast regulatory areas, the prohibition
on hired skipper use by all individuals has effectively minimized this use, but the transi-
tion to a fully individual owned fleet in these areas has been slowed by the continued
presence of corporate entities and new entry rates are comparable to other regulatory
areas.
The experience with the hired skipper provision and the prohibition on quota
share acquisition by corporate entities in the IFQ program raises the question of
how to develop effective measures to achieve active participation objectives in fish-
eries management. Perhaps the most important lesson that can be learned from
this experience is that management needs to be adaptive to the changing realities
in a fishery and to the likelihood that fishery participants will exploit loopholes if
sufficient economic incentives exist to do so. In fact, proper understanding of in-
centives is paramount for the development of effective active participation mea-
sures. The transition to owner-operated fleets in the IFQ fisheries has been slow
because individual initial recipients continue to have the incentive to hire skippers
rather than divest themselves of their quota shareholdings. That is, it seems that
many shareholders consider the retention of their shares and the use of hired skip-
pers to be more profitable than selling their shares. Because often initial recipients
are in a better financial position than hired skippers and second-generation share-
holders and because they can leverage their ownership interests in their initially al-
located shares, they are likely to be able to outbid these new entrants for quota
shares, thus also constraining entry.
According to testimony at the February 2011 NPFMC meeting, the Sunset Provision
had already begun to impact the actions of some initial recipients, who testified that
they had stopped transferring quota shares after the February 2010 control date
because they did not want to be limited in their capacity to use hired skippers for land-
ing their annual IFQ allocations. Ultimately this provision may expedite the transition
to second-generation ownership by locking initial recipients into their current holdings
and by providing a disincentive for these initial recipients to compete for quota shares.
However, the use of hired skippers is still likely to increase in the coming years as more
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initial quota share recipients become unable or unwilling to harvest their own annual
IFQ allocation, and the full impacts of the Sunset Provision will likely not be evident
for a number of years. Given this, it would seem prudent for fisheries managers to
address the lack of data on hired skipper fees/lease rates in order to better understand
the impacts of such lease rates on the profitability of the fisheries as a whole as well as
the individual profitability of different categories of quota shareholders, vessel owners,
hired skippers and new entrants to the fisheries.
New fishermen incrementally building up ownership stakes in a fishery is not
new. As a skilled trade, fishing has always had a culture of apprenticeship, with
fishermen working their way up from the deck to the wheelhouse. What is differ-
ent with catch share programs is that, for the most part, initial recipients are
granted quota shares gratis and second-generation shareholders have to pay for
them, which can create inter-generational equity issues. The intent of the NPFMC
in the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ program was not to ensure that all initial
recipients could use hired skippers in the long run, but it was seen as being too
burdensome administratively to tie the hired skipper privilege to the actual quota
shares (NPFMC 2014). The transition towards hired skipper use by many individual
initial recipients, who had previously not used hired skippers to fish their annual
IFQ allocations, has in turn slowed the transition to second-generation ownership
of catcher vessel shares. At the same time, the increasing use of hired skippers
means that initial recipients are benefiting not only from the windfall gains of
freely allocated quota shares but from the income they are generating as lessors,
which presumably is higher than what they could earn with other investments.
This may exacerbate the inter-generational equity issues that arise with initial
allocations and the differentiation of the privileges associated with quota share
holdings based on generation (e.g., using a hired skipper), especially if it results in
initial recipients delaying when they sell their shares and how much the shares are
worth.
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